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I Introduction
The emerging economies of East Asia had a history
not only of sound macroeconomic management,
high growth and investment, but also of above
average achievements in human development.
Promotion of Human Development (HD) involves
improving human conditions so as to enlarge
choices. Health, nutrition and education are partic-
ularly important elements in a human development
strategy especially at the early stages of develop-
ment.' It can be argued that human development
achievements were a crucial ingredient in the East
Asian spectacular success. All rhischanged in 1997
when difficulties in export markets and lack of
access to international finance initiated the current
economic and financial crisis.
This article aims to analyse the nature of adjust-
ment from an HD perspective in the five countries
most seriously affected by the crisis: Thailand,
Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.
The first part of the article is devoted to reviewing
the way in which HD is likely to be affected by the
crisis (section 2). Section 3 suggests remedies,
including the main elements of a pro-Human
Development adjustment package. Section 4
presents conclusions.
2 The Crisis and Human
Development
In order to understand the way in which the crisis
affects HD, it is important first to analyse the mech-
anisms by which HD was so effectively advanced in
the past in much of East and Southeast Asia.
Human Development is the outcome of the rate of
economic growth and the way that it is generated
and allocated. It is important to differentiate
between two types of income: first, primary
income (or private income), i.e. income derived
from the economic system, including employment
and self-employment, subsistence production and
income from assets; secondly, secondary income or
social income, derived from the state via social pro-
duction of free (or subsidised) goods and services
and income transfers (e.g. unemployment
The Human Development approach was initiated by
the UNDP in a succession of Human Development
Reports - see especially the first report (1990) for a
discussion of the definition of Human Development.
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benefits). (Private transfers - most often within
families - can provide another important source of
support.) Poverty arises when either primary or sec-
ondary incomes are inadequate to meet what are
considered minimum needs.2 The first type of
poverty maybe called private income poverty (PIP)
and the second, social income poverty (SIP). PIP
depends on how primary income is distributed
among households, SIP on how secondary income
is allocated by government to social priorities.
Together they determine the relationship between
growth and the basic objective of HD.
2.1 Review of past achievements on
Human Development, 1970-90
Turning first to PIP, each of the countries, apart
from the Philippines, was remarkably successful in
reducing both rural and urban poverty over the past
25 years: in Indonesia PIP was estimated at around
57 per cent of the population in 1970 and had
fallen to just 15 per cent by 1990; in Korea in 1984
PIP was estimated at only 4 per cent; in Malaysia
private income poverty fell from around 50 per cent
in 1970 to 15 per cent in 1990; Thailand's rate fell
from 39 per cent at the end of the 1960s to 13 per
cent in 1992. The Philippines was the one excep-
tion, with poverty rates still at 45 per cent in 1991.
Three factors explain this generally good record on
poverty reduction: the rapid growth in output and
incomes, the generally high employment elasticity
of output growth, and the sustained growth in agri-
cultural productivity With the exception of the
Philippines, the countries enjoyed growth in per
capita income of 6-8 per cent for most of the
period. Moreover, the growth was led by labour-
intensive exports generating a fast rise in employ-
ment. For example, in the 1980s Indonesia's
manufacturing employment is estimated to have
grown by 11 per cent pa., while that of Korea grew
by nearly 6 per cent p.a. and that of Malaysia by
over 4 per cent p.a. In the Philippines, in contrast,
there was slow growth in per capita incomes and
manufacturing employment fell during the 1980s.
2 There is much debate on how to define the 'poverty
line' and how to measure the numbers who fall below it,
including efforts to incorporate some indication of the
depth of poverty This debate will not be considered
here.
Estimates of poverty vary greatly according to how the
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In each country, there was also reasonably high
growth in agricultural output, contributing to rising
rural incomes, both in agriculture and in linked
non-agricultural activities. Thus the generally
remarkable improvement in PIP was achieved as a
consequence both of the high growth in GDP and
the composition of that growth.
It should, therefore, be emphasised that the
reduction in PIP was due to the workings of the
economy and not to safety-net type schemes aimed
at helping the poor. Generally, there were rather few
specific interventions in place to aid the poor,
which is not surprising in view of the fact that
poverty was falling without government interven-
tion directed towards that end.
SIP also fell substantially over the same period. For
example, in Malaysia 40 per cent of the population
had no access to health services in 1980 and this
had fallen to 12 per cent by 1993. In Thailand 34
per cent of the population were without access to
safe water in 1980 and by 1994 this had fallen to 19
per cent. In 1965, 78 per cent of girls were not
enrolled in secondary school in Malaysia, and by
1993 the proportion had dropped to 39 per cent; in
Indonesia 93 per cent of girls did not go to sec-
ondary school in 1965, and by 1993 the proportion
was 61 per cent.
Good performance on SIP was again due to a com-
bination of high economic growth and its alloca-
tion. These countries did not devote a particularly
high proportion of their GDP to government expen-
diture (below 20 per cent, with the exception of
Malaysia where the proportion was nearly 30 per
cent in the 1980s), although they did have a quite
high social allocation ratio (i.e. the proportion of
government expenditure going to the social sec-
tors); for example, Thailand spent 16 per cent of
government expenditure on the education and
health sectors in the 1980s, rising to 28 per cent in
the 1990s, while Malaysia had a social allocation
ratio above 20 per cent. Indonesia's was lower, but
poverty line is drawn, the price indices used, and
whether households or individuals are counted. The
estimates above are derived from a variety of surveys
brought together by H. Tabatabai (1996) Statistics on
Poverty and Income Distribution, ILO, Geneva. The
precise figures may easily be disputed, but the direction
of change is clear.
Table 1: Social expenditure in most affected countries, 1980-95
Source: World Bank, 1997, World Development Indicators, UNDP 1997 Human Development Report, UNESCO, 1995 World
Education Report and 1996 Statistical Yearbook
was well distributed, with an emphasis on primary
education and health care (see Table 1).
While the proportion of GDP going to the social
sectors was not particularly high by international
standards, fast economic growth meant that social
expenditure increased rapidly. For example, it is
estimated that expenditure per head on education
increased threefold or more in Indonesia, Malaysia,
Korea and Thailand between 1980 and 1995, but
by much less in the Philippines.
Despite this good performance, there remained
significant levels of SIP in the Philippines, Thailand
and Indonesia, with a quite substantial proportion
of the people without access to some basic services,
as is apparent from some of the figures given above.
But SIP was very low in Korea and relatively low in
Malaysia.
Those who did remain in poverty over time, the
'old' poor, mainly those who failed to gain access to
formal sector jobs or modern social services,
remained largely dependent on traditional support
systems, i.e. from the family, the informal sector and
the community, while NGOs (local and foreign)
provided a bit of support. They had not been
'floated out of poverty by the spectacular rise of
income and its relatively equitable distribution
experienced by most of the countries under obser-
vation. But by the mid-1990s their numbers, as we
have observed, were generally not large by least
developed countries (LDC) standards; the 'new
poor created by the crisis potentially represent a
quantitatively more formidable problem.
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2.2 Impact of the crisis
We should distinguish between the consequences
of three types of change associated with the crisis:
the immediate effects of the sharp reversal from
capital inflows to outflows; government policy
changes, including those demanded by the IMF;
and individual and household responses. The first
of these constitutes the source of the problem, while
the latter two represent efforts to adjust to it.
With respect to PIP, there is likely to be a severe
decline in income as formal sector output and
employment are reduced, due to the worsening
financial situation, contractionary fiscal and mone-
tary policies, and devaluation, together leading to
private bankruptcies and downsizing in both pri-
vate and public enterprises and reductions in the
size of the civil service - usually all under the aus-
pices of the IMP
The effect of these responses is likely to be a large
and sudden increase in unemployment, and conse-
quently an increase in PIP Some reverse migration
has already begun as countries eject foreign work-
ers, creating refugees and additional poverty in their
countries of origin (as recipients of such ejected
workers, the Philippines and Indonesia are likely to
be most adversely affected in the region).
People working in the urban informal sector, who
account for as much as half of the urban labour
force in some countries, will not be so immediately
or severely affected by these policies. But those in
the 'modernising' subsector will suffer through their
linkages to the formal sector and consequently see a
Country Govt. expenditure
% GDP
Education expenditure
% government
Health expenditure
% government
Education plus health
% GDP
1980-90 1990-95 1980-90 1990-95 1980-90 1990-95 1980-90 1990-95
Indonesia 20.2 17.3 8.9 10.5 2.5 2.7 2.3 2.3
Korea, R. 16.6 17 21.5 17.7 1.3 1.1 3.8 3.2
Malaysia 28.9 26.1 16.4 16.6 4.4 5.6 6.0 5.8
Philippines 16.5 19 9.1 10.5 5 3 2.3 2.6
Thailand 16.4 14.9 12.1 19.8 4.2 8.1 2.7 4.2
Av. Asia 19.6 20 10.5 12.3 4.2 4.4 2.9 3.3
diminution in their markets for producer and
consumer goods. In the traditional part of the infor-
mal sector, new entrants from the newly unem-
ployed will depress average incomes there.
The agricultural sector is less affected by the crisis,
except for the special situation in Indonesia where a
coincidence of drought and forest fires is severely
curtailing food output and reducing agricultural
incomes. There will be some tendency, especially in
Thailand and Malaysia, for ruralurban reverse
migration, which is liable to depress average
incomes in agriculture and increase rural poverty,
while providing shared subsistence for the
migrants.
There are many ways ici which households and
individuals adjust to crisis. We have already men-
tioned the move back into the urban informal sec-
tor and into agriculture. Other responses are likely
to include some increase in the female labour force
participation rate, especially in the informal sector,
while the male participation rate decreases as for-
mal sector employment opportunities fall back,
although women's employment in some of the
export industries will also be adversely affected.
Households also adjust to reduced family incomes
by substituting low-cost for high-cost sources of
nutrition, and by reducing 'luxury' consumption
generally The effects on nutrition are likely to be
less marked than effects on income, especially as
women gain greater control over household income
with increased participation. But it is likely that
expenditure on items such as education - school
uniforms and books - will tend to be cut back.
All in all, household and community adjustments
may moderate the negative impact of the crisis, but
cannot eliminate it, especially since the adversity is
generalised, and in some cases (e.g. Indonesia)
exacerbated by other exogenous shocks.
Taken from the Financial Times, 22 May 1998, apart
from Korea which comes from Neil Saker of SocGen
Crosby in Singapore, quoted in Financial Times, 11
February 1998. ADB forecasts are less alarmist (at +2.4
per cent for the Philippines, +2.5 per cent Malaysia -
1.0 per cent Korea, and -3.0 per cent in both Indonesia
and Thailand) (Financial Times, 24 April 1998). The
Bank of Korea, however, reported an actual decline in
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Forecasts for GDP contraction in 1998 are for 7.8
per cent in Indonesia, 4.1 per cent in Thailand, 2.8
per cent in Malaysia, and 2.3 per cent in Korea.4
The Philippines is expected to continue to show
reduced but positive growth of around 2.0 per cent
in 1997, while Malaysia's GDP is expected to be
roughly stable. But forecasts change month-by-
month. There is a likelihood of large reductions in
employment in the modern sector, of perhaps 10-
15 per cent in Indonesia and Thailand. All such fig-
ures are, of course, speculative. Actual
developments depend on how the crisis is handled,
including success in sustaining or restoring political
stability (especially in Indonesia).
It is estimated that at least 6-12 million Indonesians
may lose their jobs in 1998. In Korea, the downsiz-
ing of chaebols may result in the loss of one-and-a
half million jobs, as 3,000 businesses became bank-
rupt each month. By May 1998, unemployment
had already doubled to 1.5 million and was
expected to reach 2 million by the summer.5 In
Malaysia, employment cuts will fall initially on the
foreign population from Burma, Bangladesh,
Cambodia and Indonesia. The government is
expected to expel half the 1.8 million foreign work-
ers. Thailand has already committed itself to
restructuring public enterprises, closing many
finance companies and some banks, all steps trans-
lating into job cuts. Like Malaysia, Thailand hopes
to lessen the pain of unemployment for Thais by
slashing the number of foreign workers.
The newly unemployed will obviously suffer a
drastic loss in income. Those who retain their jobs
are also suffering as a result of the sharp price rises
associated with devaluation and the removal of
price controls and subsidies. For example, in Korea
petroleum prices were already up by nearly 40 per
cent and kerosene prices by 80 per cent by the end
of 1997. In Indonesia, employees have suffered real
wage cuts of around 50 per cent. Although the
reductions in employment will not directly hit the
GDP of 3.8 per cent for the first quarter of 1998, a fall
of investment of 40 per cent and of consumption of 10
per cent (Financial Times, 27 May 1998). Moreover, the
expectations about Indonesian incomes worsen as the
political crisis develops: one estimate is for a fall in
income of 15 per cent in 1988 (Financial Times, 23-24
May 1998).
Financial Times, 18 May 1998.
pre-existing poor in the first instance, there are
bound to be knock-on effects arising from the
reduced dynamism of the formal sector and the
price rises associated with currency depreciation,
increased indirect taxation, and, in the case of
Indonesia particularly, rising food prices resulting
from the agricultural crisis as well as disruptions in
transport and distribution due to the political crisis.
The old poor, especially in the urban areas, are
likely to be especially severely affected since, possi-
bly unlike the new poor, they do not have the buffer
of prior savings.
Inmost of the countries, there are virtually no safety
nets for the newly unemployed. The traditional sys-
tems that supported the poor in the past - the abil-
ity to retreat to subsistence production, close family
links and support from the community - have been
seriously weakened with the advent of a dynamic,
modern, urban economy Yet new social security
systems suited to a modern industrial economy
have not yet been put in place. The reliance on a
growing economy which proved to be so successful
in reducing poverty over the previous 20 years had
a severe flaw in making no provision for social secu-
rity for the newly unemployed, except for Korea
where some unemployment insurance is in place.
In Korea, unemployment insurance extends to
about one quarter of the jobless - those who have
paid sufficient contributions in the past - and they
will be covered for only a few months on half pay.
But most of the newly unemployed workers in
Korea, and almost all elsewhere, are likely to suffer
considerable hardship unless some provisions are
put in place; but at a time of crisis it is not possible
to introduce comprehensive support systems.6
Turning to SIP, government expenditure is likely to
be reduced, though the extent depends on the pol-
icy package ultimately agreed upon. In any event, a
reduction in the growth rate will have a downward
effect on public expenditure. There is likely to be
some increase in the proportion of government
The situation bears resemblance to that of nineteenth
century Britain. When the previous systems for
protecting the poor had broken down, the emerging
industrial society posed new problems of cyclical and
chronic unemployment, arsd there was as yet no
provision for the support of the unemployed. The harsh
Poor Laws in Britain of 1834 were a response to
parishes' inability or unwillingness to provide for the
many migrants associated with the industrial revolution
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expenditure going to foreign debt servicing
following devaluation, but the effects will be less
than in the Latin American case because more of the
debt is in the private sector; there is also, however,
a danger of a rising proportion of government
expenditure going to bail-outs, due to government
guarantees, implicit or explicit. Por both these rea-
sons there is likely to be downward pressure on the
proportion of government expenditure available for
the social sectors, i.e. the social allocation ratio.
With the downward pressure on both total govern-
ment expenditure and the social allocation ratio,
SIP is likely to rise in the absence of specific coun-
termeasures. Nevertheless, it seems probable that
the short run deterioration in PIP will be more acute
than the deterioration in SIP since SIP usually has
its own momentum and is rarely reversed quickly
3 Suggested Remedies
The objective of all the remedies to be discussed
here is to attempt to minimise the HD cost of the
inevitable need to adjust to the crisis. This will
include the avoidance of unnecessary losses in GDP,
as well as specific policies to protect human devel-
opment among those worst affected. In this discus-
sion we will first focus on the real and then the
financial adjustments at the macro level, before
turning to specific actions at meso and micro levels.
3.1 Real adjustments
The macro situation is key to determining the
extent and duration of the crisis. It is essential to
avoid excessive deflation and attempt to achieve
recovery as quickly as possible. It is widely
acknowledged that the IMP, under the influence of
its prior Latin American experience, has tended to
overstate the deflationary requirements of crisis
management, particularly initially, and has focussed
excessively on the government accounts. Among
the adjustments required, priority should be given
and the enclosure movement. The Poor Laws provided
minimal support for the destitute, often in horrendous
conditions in workhouses. They did not meet the needs
of the 'new poor' created by cyclical industrial
unemployment. While the beneficiaries from the Poor
Law provisions amounted to less than 3 per cent of the
population in 1885, Booth and Rowntree estimated
urban poverty at about 30 per cent. (See M. Rose, 1986,
The Relief of Poverty 1834-1914, London: Macmillan.)
to measures which restore the confidence of the
private sector, rather than placing an excessive
emphasis on government cutbacks.
There clearly exists an overall absorption problem
which has to be faced since foreign financing has
been drastically reduced and current account
deficits remain high. Although the IMF/World
Bank/ADB (Asian Develpment Bank) plus bilateral
donors have already contributed or will contribute
some additional finance to cover short-term needs,
such contributions are likely to be inadequate to
meet the aggregate needs arising from debt servic-
ing and the current account. As absorption is
reduced it is important to protect private consump-
tion by the poor as well as the social expenditure
directed towards the poor. Unavoidable cuts should
be focussed on luxury consumption as well as 'lux-
ury investment'. In general, given the very high past
levels of investment, their deteriorating quality, and
the probably temporary nature of the crisis, a large
proportion of the burden of any cuts should be
focussed on investment rather than on
consumption by the majority of the population.
With respect to the public sector, what is needed
most of all is a reorientation of government expen-
diture: this will require a major reduction in
defence expenditure7 and a thorough review of gov-
ernment infrastructure projects with strict prioriti-
saiSon, the cancelling of some clearly uneconomic
prestige projects, the postponing of others, pro-
ceeding only with those which have clear priority
for economic growth andlor HD maintenance.
Within the private sector a parallel reorientation of
private investment and consumption is called for -
away from real estate and towards new and produc-
tive sectors; and away from luxury consumption by
the rich to consumption by the poor. Such reorien-
tation may be achieved by the use of excise taxes on
real estate and luxury consumption. In the longer
run a review of indirect taxes and subsidies in each
country is needed to remove subsidies from all non-
Defence expenditure cuts already are underway: in
Malaysia defence expenditure was estimated to have
been cut by a fifth in 1998, with further cuts planned,
with a reduction of over 40 per cent in real terms in
Indonesia, a 35 per cent cut in the defence budget in
Thailand, and 30 per cent in S.Korea (Herald Tribune,
23 April 1998).
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essentials (including food consumed largely by the
rich), to raise indirect taxes on high income con-
sumer goods, to remove them on products con-
sumed mainly by the poor, and, if fiscally feasible,
to introduce subsidies on a few basic food items
consumed largely by poor urban consumers.
in the longer term current account deficits should
be constrained to moderate levels (with 4 per cent
of GDP a maximum, and rates of 2-3 per cent
preferable on a sustained basis) to avoid a build-up
of debt obligations and the consequent vulnerabil-
ity to speculative attacks. It is notable that the three
Asian systems relatively unaffected by the current
crisis - China, Taiwan, and Singapore - have been
running surpluses or, as in China's case, only a
small deficit expressed as a percentage of GDP
Within limits, foreign borrowing is not inappropri-
ate for emerging countries but makes sense only if
it is allocated to productive investment as opposed
to consumption binges or real estate speculation.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is preferable to
short-term portfolio flows, as it is less volatile,
shown by the fact that it has been affected little by
the recent crisis.8 Countries should therefore take
measures to encourage FDI, at least relative to
short-term portfolio capital flows, by providing dis-
incentives for the latter along the lines of the one-
year deposit requirement (without interest
payment) adopted by Chile or some variant thereof.
However, it would be politically undesirable and
economically second-best to encourage bargain-
basement purchases of existing facilities by foreign
investors.
3.2 Financial sector adjustments
To achieve stabilisation there is a need to generate
renewed confidence by foreign investors in these
economies, in order to avoid further capital out-
flows and further declines in the exchange rate. As
already pointed out, this requires regaining the con-
fidence of foreign private investors in the
S A survey of multinational companies by UNCTAD
showed that 88 per cent of firms intend to press ahead
with or accelerate their existing investment plans in East
and Southeast Asia. While 12 per cent intend to reduce
their investments, a quarter of the firms intend to
increase them in response to new opportunities created
by the crisis (Financial Times, 19 March 1998).
effectiveness of the reform package. So far this has
not been achieved in Indonesia, and only partially
elsewhere. Such restoration of confidence would be
greatly assisted by larger standby commitments,
including by foreign governments, which may not
need to be drawn upon. In the case of Mexico in
1994, such a commitment was provided primarily
by the US. In Asia it seems appropriate that Japan
should play an equivalent leadership role, possible
US and IMF objections notwithstanding.
Second, it is necessary to reconsider the fixed
exchange rate policies of the past and replace them
with managed floats. The fixed rate vis-à-vis the
dollar led to unjustified exchange rate appreciation
and made the economies increasingly uncompeti-
tive compared with China and Japan, ultimately
generating speculation against the currencies. With
more flexible exchange rates it should also be
unnecessary to maintain such extremely high inter-
est rates; however, some rise in real interest rates
relative to the pre-crisis situation may be warranted
in the short-term to curtail some of the less pro-
ductive investments, which will help the countries
deal with the problem of reducing their absorption.
Third, in each country, instead of bail-outs or
allowing the market to determine the fate of com-
panies through mass bankruptcies, a review of
financial institutions and enterprises is needed, dis-
tinguishing between good and bad debts, and
allowing for mergers, bankruptcies and rescues, as
appropriate. In addition, the entire debt situation of
each country, and of the major indebted enterprises
within it, should be reviewed, swapping short- for
long-term debt at as favourable terms as possible. In
this context, foreign private investors should be
made to share in the costs of adjustment, along with
everyone else.
Fourth, consideration should be given urgently to
the adoption of Brady Loan-type packages for each
country In the absence of such packages it would
be especially difficult for these countries to export
their way out of debt, given the fact that they are
already highly export-oriented.9
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Fifth, financial sector reforms are urgently needed.
These include the full disclosure of the size of foreign
exchange reserves, bank balance sheets and non-per-
forming loans; total foreign currency reserves should
be at least as big as total short-term liabilities; orderly
bankruptcy procedures and their implementation are
needed; as is the substitution of objective risk analy-
ses and arms-length credit allocations for political
favouritism and government guarantees of private
loans; general adherence to Bank of International
Settlements (BIS) recommendations on the adequacy
of bank capital reserves must be enforced; and most
importantly, local banks must be forbidden to be net
debtors in hard currency
Sixth, there should be no further liberalisation of
capital accounts at this time, and certainly not
before the financial sector reforms have been
gradually put in place.
3.3 Suggested meso and micro actions
Currently there are few policies in place to protect
either the old or the new poor, since, as noted ear-
lier, these countries were able to rely on a growing
economy to float their people out of poverty over
time. Therefore, there is an urgent need to intro-
duce some new policies to deal with the human
impact of the crisis.
The need for support - in terms of numbers to be
covered and duration of coverage - will depend
critically on what happens to the macro-economy,
as has been pointed out above. This is the funda-
mental reason why deflationary policies should be
avoided as much as possible, and the focus be put
on improved regulatory and financial systems to
reestablish confidence in the system.
A universally accessible support system should have
the following features:
Some provision, of one kind or another, to be
available for all who need it, not limited in
coverage by a pre-set expenditure limit.
Whatever form it takes, individual support
should be set at feasible levels (e.g. at the nation-
ally defined poverty level). This would almost
The example of Latin America in the 1980s is stagnation before the Brady Plan turned the Situation
instructive. It took eight years or so of economic around.
certainly mean a cut in living standards for the
newly unemployed compared with their
previous situation.
There is talk by the International Finance
Institutions (IFIs) of the need to introduce some
social safety nets. Yet the past record of safety nets
which IFIs have supported elsewhere has been
extremely poor, in that the schemes have almost
invariably reached only a fraction of those in need.
Food subsidies have been narrowly targeted, miss-
ing the majority of the poor, while Social Funds
and/or special credit schemes have typically
covered an even smaller proportion.
The following types of programme should be con-
sidered to help offset the rise in PIP, depending on
the particular situation:
Public employment schemes aimed especially at
the newly unemployed, in both urban and rural
areas. The idea would be that jobs at low wages
are available to anyone who comes forward. The
schemes should contribute to appropriate infra-
structural projects in rural and urban areas, in
part possibly replacing some of the larger scale
schemes that may have to be cut at the national
level. In some cases, the military, especially those
with engineering skills, could help organise and
develop these projects. Support systems of this
type have been helpful in adjusting countries
elsewhere in the world, e.g. Chile and
Botswana.'° In the early 1980s Chile introduced
open-ended public works schemes that were
effective in reaching as many as wanted employ-
ment at the very low wages offered. At one point
13 per cent of the labour force was employed in
these schemes.'1
Supply of food relief channelled through the
market in order to bring food prices down where
there has been significant agricultural failure -
notably Indonesia. Such provision should
"See G.A. Cornia, R. Jolly and E Stewart (eds.) (1987)
Adjustment with a Human Face, Oxford: O.U.P
"See D. Raczynski and P Romaguera (1992) 'Chile:
poverty, adjustment and socïal policies in the 1980s',
paper prepared for the conference Confronting the
Challenges of Poverty and Inequality in Latin America,
The Brookings Institution and Inter-American Dialogue,
16-17 July, Washington DC, Santiago: CIEPLAN.
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preferably use domestic buffer stocks,
supplemented only if necessary by international
shipments of food aid.
Provision of food for especially vulnerable
elements of the population, such as babies, chil-
dren and pregnant and lactating women. Such
schemes should be located in low-income areas
(urban and rural).
Credit allocation for small and low income
investors, i.e. those without substantial assets for
collateral. This would be facilitated by requiring
commercial banks to set aside a certain propor-
tion of their loans at competitive rates for this
purpose. In most cases, they would achieve this
by lending to intermediaries such as the
Grameen Bank or the Self-Employed Women's
Association, specialising in this type of loan.
In general, measures to facilitate people's own
adjustments are desirable, e.g. subsidies to com-
munity organisations providing meals for those
in poverty'2 or setting up nurseries to look after
the small children of mothers who have been
forced to seek work.
The crisis underlines the need for a more self-
reliant strategy; with a greater focus especially on
balanced growth in the rural areas. This implies
encouraging rural non-agricultural activities,
including both industry and services, which are
usually linked to the agricultural sector as
inputs, processing or for rural consumption.'3 To
the extent that urban industry and services con-
tinue to be relatively favoured by government
policy, such discrimination should be removed,
and infrastructural expenditure more equitably
distributed throughout the country a process
which may be facilitated by a greater degree of
decentralisation.
"As, for example, the Comedores Populares in Peru.
13 For an analysis of the difference the polïcy framework
can make in this regard see G. Ranis and E Stewart
(1993) 'Rural non-agricultural activities in development:
theory and application', Journal of Development
Economics, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 75-102.
Local governments and NGOs have an
important role in assisting the newly unem-
ployed moving into the informal Sector or back
to the rural areas and in promoting rural link-
ages, e.g. by providing public works, small
credit schemes and information. They may also
be able to tap additional local resources.
Information about all measures adopted to
reduce PIP should be well publicised, both so
that people can take advantage of them and that
they do not have false expectations about the
likely extent of state support.
For the longer term, these newly industrialising
countries need to develop systems of insurance
for the unemployed as the traditional support
systems weaken, particularly once the majority
of the labour force has moved into modern sec-
tor employment. As noted above, a start has
been made in South Korea. Such systems would
involve small compulsory contributions from
employers and employees which would provide
some income at a low level, say half their wage
income over a transitional period. Equally, a
longer term aim should be the provision of small
means-tested pensions for those who cannot
work (the old and handicapped specifically), as
has been effectively introduced in some poor
areas (e.g. Tamil Nadu). These measures cannot
be introduced immediately, given the financial
situation, but should be explored after economic
recovery They would ameliorate the human
effects of possible future crises.
As far as social poverty is concerned, as noted
above, there is likely to be a considerable squeeze
on expenditure on social priorities, given the pres-
sure on total government expenditure and the
demands of interest payments and industry bail-
outs. Under these circumstances it is vital that pri-
ority services (primary health, potable water, and
primary and secondary education) be protected,
and that charges for these services are not intro-
duced, especially at a time when PIP is rising. To
achieve this, it will be necessary to (i) resist undue
reductions in total government expenditure, (ii)
maintain the social allocation ratio, and (iii)
improve the allocation within the social sectors
H See E Stewart (1995) Adjustment and Poverty: Options and Choices, London: Routledge, Chapter 8.
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towards items which benefit the poor. For example,
it is important to maintain primary education, pos-
sibly at the expense of government expenditure on
universities. Indonesia provided a successful exam-
ple of selective cuts in government expenditure
which protected priorities in the early 1980s.'4
As pointed out above, the countries in the region
differ quite significantly in the proportion of GDP
available for government expenditure (the expendi-
ture ratio), in their social allocation ratios and in the
proportion of social expenditure going to priorities
for HD maintenance or growth. The appropriate
policy mix will differ accordingly Where the expen-
diture and social allocation ratios are already high,
as for example in Malaysia, there is considerable
scope for improving performance on SIP by reallo-
cation within the social sectors towards HD-ori-
ented priorities, while it would be difficult to raise
expenditure and social allocation ratios substan-
tially In contrast, where the proportion of GDP
going to government expenditure and the social
allocation ratio are low, efforts should be made to
raise both these ratios. An example is Indonesia
where the INPRES system has ensured reasonably
good priority allocation within the social sectors but
where there exists a large potential for raising the
expenditure and social allocation ratios.
An important issue is how the efforts just described
to contain the rises in PIP and SIP in the context of
the crisis would be financed. As implied above,
examination of the budgets of any of the countries
affected would lead to the conclusion that there
remains much 'fat' which could be eliminated, and
other projects which could be postponed. These
include military expenditure and some large-scale
prestige projects, mainly infrastructural. Systematic
in-depth reviews would be needed to identify pre-
cise candidates for budget reallocation. Potential
resources to finance some of the schemes suggested
above can undoubtedly be found from such reallo-
cation. It is important to remember that even in a
tightly constrained government budget major sav-
ings can usually be made not only in military
expenditure but also in administration and in the
avoidance of low-priority expenditure of other
types.
Revenue-raising efforts by local governments
should also be facilitated (e.g. by reducing restric-
tions on their tax-raising powers), particularly since
they are likely to play a significant role in assisting
the newly unemployed. It should be noted that the
whole of public expenditure on the education and
health sectors amounts to only between 2.5 and 5
per cent of GDP in these countries, while invest-
ment rates are generally over 30 per cent. Unlike
other countries, investment rates are so high that
there is a considerable potential for redirecting
resources, public and private, to those social sector
activities which directly affect low income groups.
Reform of the legal system is another important
longer term reform needed to secure greater social
justice, contributing to improving both SIP and PIP
Much misery and deprivation originates from
human exploitation, either by private groups or by
the state. The key factor in bringing about respect
for civil rights is the existence of a fair and equitable
judicial system. But resource scarcity combined
with manipulation and collusion by the powerful,
has often biased the law in favour of the privileged.
Access to the legal system is an important social
good, often neglected in the analysis of poverty It is
not only a significant aspect of well-being in itself,
but can also be essential to the enforcement of eco-
nomic rights (e.g. the use of common or tradition-
ally held resources). Legal access for women is
particularly important and usually disproportion-
ately weak. The absence of law, order, and judicial
services, especially in poor neighbourhoods,
severely limits the exercise of individual civil and
property rights. In the longer term, a review of the
legal situation, especially with respect to legal
access by the poor, could improve both SIP and PIP
with little budgetary expenditure required. The first
prerequisite is that there exist a comprehensive and
equitable system in the nation as a whole; the sec-
ond, that the physical proximity of courts be suffi-
cient to ensure reasonable access; the third, that
poor people be able to procure proper representa-
tion in the courts and not be prevented from doing
so by the absence of willing legal representatives or
excessive costs. There is little systematic evidence
available on these issues. A first priority is to collect
One observer is said to have commented: We give
countries a choice: the wrong advice from the Fund
straight away or the right advice from the Bank too late'
(quoted in the Financial Times). Actually, the countries
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such information so that the adequacy of legal
access can be assessed on a country-by-country
basis.
3.4 The role of international institutions
The prime responsibility for adjustment to the
crisis while protecting HD must clearly rest with the
countries themselves. International agencies, how-
ever, can influence the outcome, hopefully for the
good. Thus far, the principal international actor has
been the IMF, with the World Bank one step behind.
1. The notion of IMF infallibility has, however,
become a casualty of recent events. Not only did
the Fund fail to warn the countries adequately of
impending problems, but its initial response was
too much rooted in its prior Latin American
experience, regarding the central problem as one
of government profligacy in both its fiscal and
monetary dimensions. Moreover, both Fund and
Bank continue to urge further liberalisation on
the capital account, which we believe to be inap-
propriate at this time. The fact that the IMP
quickly had to go to second and third round
amendments of its country packages in the
region can be viewed as commendable, showing
unusual flexibility but it also meant that it failed
to contribute to the early restoration of interna-
tional confidence.15 After all, it is generally
agreed that it is not the public capital flows
made available by the IMP and others which
matter - these are small in relation to the total
size of short-term debtsbut the return of private
flows as a consequence of restored confidence.
The conclusion from this is that the institution
seems ill-equipped to respond to crises that are
primarily micro- and private-sector oriented,
given its traditional focus on monitoring and
affecting macro- and public-sector performance.
We recommend that the IMF return to its origi-
nal charter obligations, macroeconomic stability
while leaving to others - mainly the countries
themselves - the responsibility for structural
reform.
are NOT given that choice, but have to take Fund
advice, nor is it clear that World Bank advice has been
notably better.
The World Bank's prime contribution should be
to provide support for structural reforms, possi-
bly including financial sector reform, while
desisting from pushing for across-the-board
additional liberalisation at this stage. However,
the BIS and some experienced central bankers
from outside the region - e.g. Chile, Colombia
or some OECD countries - are probably in a bet-
ter position than the World Bank to provide
advice on the hands-on details of the working
out of existing debt and financial sector reforms.
Handling the current crisis clearly requires a
much greater input of local knowledge than
exhibited by the still highly centralised Breton
Woods institutions. Nuanced advice and assis-
tance cannot be provided by short-term visiting
teams. Agencies rooted in the region should take
a leading role, in collaboration with local
experts, in helping governments develop a spe-
cific agenda of reform along the general lines
outlined in this paper and in monitoring
changes. This would mean a much greater role
for Japan, the Asian Development Bank (ADB),
and UNDP We suggest revival of the proposal
for the creation of an Asian Fund, previously
rejected by the IMF and the US. Such a fund
would be in a better position to develop policy
packages that are sensitive to local conditions, as
well as to secure additional financial commit-
ments from countries in the region, including
not only Japan but also Australia, Singapore and
Taiwan. It is unreasonable for the US to prod
Japan consistently to play a larger international
role, but equally consistently to reject specific
initiatives that Japan puts forward. Finance from
the proposed Asian Fund could contribute to
debt restructuring and structural adjustment
packages developed in collaboration with the
IMF, the World Bank and bilateral donors.
The UNDP, including relevant United Nations
specialised agencies, particularly UNICEF and
WHO, should create a specifically HD-oriented
partnership with the ADB, based on their more
differentiated local knowledge and acceptability.
This partnership should:
Focus on monitoring the HO consequences of
the crisis and reactions to it, country by country
Finance highly qualified local experts and, with
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their cooperation, identify appropriate policy
packages that are likely to contain poverty levels
and help maintain HD
Identify and finance the specific pro-HD project
and programme activities outlined in general
terms above
Increase public awareness, locally and interna-
tionally, of the importance of the HD conse-
quences of the crisis and of the fact that progress
on I-ID can be maintained in spite of the crisis, if
sharp increases in PIP, and especially in SIP, are
avoided by the sort of measures discussed earlier.
4 Conclusions
The economic crisis is already having very harsh
human consequences, and these are likely to
increase over the next few months. A great deal will
depend on how the crisis is handled, and on the
political consequences that follow It is already
apparent that, while the crisis seems to have had
common origins, country reaction has differed
greatly. On the one hand, Indonesia's financial and
economic crisis and the severe policies required by
the IMF to deal with it have precipitated a political
crisis; Malaysia has recently decided to reimpose
foreign exchange controls and lower interest rates;
South Korea and Thailand are attempting to make
rapid adjustments under IMF auspices.
In each case, the magnitude of the human costs will
be closely related to the speed and magnitude of
adverse developments in the macro-economy.
Consequently, the article has focussed quite heavily
on the macro-side even though its purpose is to elu-
cidate policies to prevent human costs. The affected
economies potentially have the resources to protect
the newly unemployed and others suffering from
the crisis. But politically difficult decisions will be
needed to secure these resources, including new
sources of taxation and a drastic reorientation of
government expenditure.
It is of critical importance that human development
is protected during the recession, not only to avoid
human suffering but also to facilitate resumed eco-
nomic growth, since serious undermining of educa-
tion, health and nutrition will have adverse
economic consequences. In general, however, HO
performance tends to be affected more slowly than
incomes, in response to fluctuations in economic
activity The Asian economies are in a strong high levels of achievements on HD, they are also in
position to preserve and continue their past a particularly good position to adapt to economic
progress in HD. Moreover, because of their existing change and resume economic growth.
119
